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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
claim, then many cases would hold the claim to be extinguished.8 But if, in
fact, the settlement is only a release then the following results obtain:
(1) if the cause of action is against concurrent wrongdoers, acting in concert,
most courts would enforce the common law rule that a release to one is a
complete surrender of any cause of action against the other;9 (2) if the
release is given to one not legally liable such release, per se, will not operate
as a discharge to others who are responsible. 10 In the writer's opinion another
result could also be reached: if the release is given to one not legally liable,
such one in return, making a payment in full satisfaction of the releasee's
claim, it would appear that no concern should be had with the legal efficacy
of the release itself, but rather consider the release as merged in the satisfaction.
Thus, essentially, the transaction would be only one of full satisfaction.
In view of the above observations, the following questions become perti-
nent when considering the facts and decision of the instant case: (1) did
plaintiff intend the settlement to be a full satisfaction for the injuries sustained
in the accident? (2) did plaintiff intend only that the settlement should
operate as a release as to the parties making payment thereunder? (3) was
the settlement intended to be a release plus a hll satisfaction? The intent
mentioned above should, it would seem, be determined in the light of the
language of the settlement agreement, the amount paid, and the attending
circmnstances.
It is submitted that the above inquiries present questions of fact for jury
determination."1 Noteworthy also, the settlement could be taken as a prima
facie acknowledgment of satisfaction and the burden placed upon plaintiff
to prove that it was not.1 2 In the instant case, however, the court on its own
accord construed the settlement to be a release. In so doing, besides passing
upon what were perhaps jury questions, the court obviated the defense that
might be made upon subsequent trial as to the operation of the settlement as a
full satisfaction of plaintiff's cause of action-i.e., it had already been judicially
determined that a release only was involved.
It would seem that the determining factor in any such case as that presented
should be whether or not, in fact, plaintiff has been fully compensated. He
should never be compelled to surrender his cause of action against any
wrongdoer unless he has intentionally done so, or unless he has received full
compensation therefor.
JAMES M. CORUM.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RULES OF EVIDENCE - EFFECT OF REFUSAL FOR RE-
QUEST FOR COUNSEL ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EvIDENCE.-Defendant, a 31-year-old
college graduate with law school training, was arrested for murder and interro-
gated by police. His request for counsel was refused despite a statute making
such refusal a misdemeanor. Shortly thereafter he signed a confession. The
United State Supreme Court held, four justices dissenting, that a conviction
8.' See note 6 supra.
9. Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 (1932); Lisoski v. Anderson, 112 Mont.
112, 112 P.2d 1055 (1941); Aliian v. Ben Schlossberg Inc., 8 N. J. Super. 461, 73 A.2d
290 (1950).
10. Randall v. Gerrick, 93 Wash. 522, 161 Pac. 357 (1916).
11. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
12. See Dwy. v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915) (Irrebuttable pre-
suniption).
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based upon such a confession did not violate the due process clause of the
FouIteenth Amendment to the Constitution where it was not shown that the
refusal of counsel had a coercive or prejudicial effect on the defendant.
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
It is firmly settled that the right to counsel cannot be denied at trial without
abridging the due process clause., But the principal case leaves open the
vexatious question of how far into the proceedings antecedent to the trial
the right to counsel extends. The holding of the majority causes the right to
vary in its nature, depending on such elements as the age, intelligence, and
experience of the accused. 2 The question of whether a denial of counsel
constitutes a deprivation of due process thus becomes one of fact to be deter-
mined on the basis 9 f circumstances shown in each individual case.
3 The
dissenting judges contend that denial of the right to counsel during interroga-
tion by police should be deemed a denial of due process regardless of its
effect on the accused. This rule has, at least on the surface, the greater virtue
of certainty, and is prompted by the asserted gross injustices resulting from the
use of third degree methods to extract confessions from innocent parties. 4
Yet, tempting as it is, it is subject to the cogent objection raised by the
majority, that assuming such a rule were laid down, a single denial of the
right to counsel would be a complete and permanent bar to conviction,, since
the error could not be corrected by the grant of a new trial. 5 The advisability
of imposing such a sweeping penalty upon the state in cases where no actual
prejudice can be shown to have resulted from the denial may well be doubted.
The law of North Dakota provides that the accused shall have the right
to obtain an attorney at his request after being arrested. However, since
the vast majority of cases hold that a confession acquired by police officers
who violate this law will support a conviction,7 if the accused is to avail him-
self of the benefits granted to him by this statute he must bring a writ of
snandanus, s or in some cases, a habeas corpus proceeding.9 This presents an
interesting paradox because without the aid of counsel the accused will, in
most cases, be lacking in the necessary ability. to utilize these remedies to
obtain his rights as the legislature intended. Other deficiencies of the North
Dakota statute are manifest when it is observed that it does not restrict the
right of the accused to visit with his attorney at all reasonable hours;' 0 does
not contain a provision restricting this right in time of imminent danger of
1. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); see Beany, The Right to Counsel in American
Courts, 89 (1955). This right is incorporated into ail 48 state constitutions.
2. Accord, Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527,
38 N.W.2d 358 (1919).
3. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
4. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S.
219 (1941).
5. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 78 Sup. Ct. 1287, 1292 (1958) (dictum).
6. N. D. Rev. Code § 29-0502 (1943), see also §§ 29-0606, 29-0704.
7. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); McCleary v. State, 122 Md. 394, 89 Atl.
1100, 1103 (1914) and cases cited; State v. Neubarer, 145 Iowa 337, 124 N.W. 312
(1910).
8. People ex rel, Burgess v. Risley, 13 Abb. N. C. 186, 66 How. Pr. 67, 1 N. Y.
Crim. Rep. 492 (1883); cf. State v. Board of State Prison Comm'rs, 44 Cal.2d 1, 273
Pac. 1044 (1929).
9. Cf. Applicat'on of Chssnsan. 44 Cal.2d 1, 279 P.2d 24 (1935);. Ex part Quals,
58 Cal. App.2d 330, 136 P.2d 341 (1943); Ex parto Snydcr, 62 Cal. App. 697, 217 Pac.
777 (1923); Ex Varte Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
10, For statutes that so provide see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 544:170 (1949).
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escape;" fails to provide for absolute privacy between the accused and his
attorney; 1 2 and fails to put "teeth" into the law by rendering the officer who
willfully refuses to allow the accused this right either civilly liable to the
accused 13 or subject to criminal punishment.14
LYLE R. CARLSON
FRAUD - CIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY - OFFENSES UNDER STATUTES PRO-
HIBITING UNTRUE, DECEPTIVE, AND MISLEADING ADVERTISEvrENTS. - Defendant
corporation, a toy store, advertised merchandise as "20% to 40% off" by the
display of signs in its store windows. Upon proof of sale of three articles at
prices in excess of the prevailing price in the community, defendant was
convicted under a penal law pertaining to deceptive and misleading advertis-
ing.1 On appeal the New York Court of Appeals held, three justices dissenting,
that defendant had the right to price merchandise and then discount it as
was deemed appropriate, but could not, by the use of deceptive advertising,
create the impression that its prices were lower than the prevailing price in
the community. People v. Minjac Corp., 4 N.Y.2d 320, 151 N.E.2d 180 (1958).
New York, as did most states, 2 enacted a variation of the Printers Ink
Model Statute, which makes false advertising a criminal offense, after it be-
came evident that losses from fraudulent advertising were enormous and that
common law remedies did not furnish effectual reparation. 3 These statutes
are directed against the advertiser; 4 the organ of dissemination is not subject
to its terms.5
The policy behind these statutes is directed to the rectification of two evils:
protect the public from entering into purchases and contracts to purchase
based upon representations in deceptive advertising, 6 and protect advertisers
from unfair competition occasioned by the use of such advertisements.' Since
the purpose of the statutes is to prevent s deceptive advertising it is immaterial
11. See Minn. Stat. § 481:10 (1949).
12. See Kansas Gen. Stat. Ann. § 62-1304a ('1949).
13. See Idaho Code § 19:4115 (1947)
14. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2935:16 (Baldwins 1955).
1. N. Y. Penal Law § 421; North Dakota has substantially the same statute, N. D.
Rev. Code § 51-1201 (1943). The constitutionality of these statutes was challenged on
the basis of indefiniteness, but they were upheld. Commonwealth v. Reilly, 248 Mass.
1, 142 N.E. 915 (1924); Jasnowski v. Connolly, 192 Mich. 139, 158 N.W. 229 (1916).
2. The Regulation of Advertising, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1058, 1098 (1956)
(Forty-three states have adopted a version of the model statute); 36 Yale L. J. 1155,
1157 (1927) (North Dakota was one of the first adopting the statute in 1913).
3. See State v. Bacon Publishing Co., 141 Kan. 734, 42 P.2d 960 (1935).
4. People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App.2d 771, 100 P.2d 550 (1940) (fact that others
wrote ad and defendant acted on orders in causing it to be publisbed is no excuse). N.
D. Rev. Code § 51-1202 (1943) (punishment for one aiding another in violation of
§ 51-1201).
5. See State v. Bacon Publishing Co., 141 Kan. 734, 42 P.2d 960 (1935); Amalga-
mated Furniture Factories v. Rochester Times Union, 128 Mics. 673, 219 N. Y. Supp.
705 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (Newspaper which had sold advertising space may refuse to per-
form contract if advertisement is of prohibited character because it need not cooperate
knowingly in the commission of a crime); Goldsmith v. Jewish Press 'Publishing Co.,
118 Mics. 789, 195 N. Y. Supp. 37 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (organ of dissemination not re-
quired to censor advertisements, but intimation that publication after notice of unlawful
nature of ad is an improper act for which there might be prosecution).
6. See State v. Andrew Schoch,"Grocery Co., 193 Minn. 91, 257 N.W. 810 (1934).
7. See People v. Glubo, 5 App. Div.2d 527, 174 N. Y. S.2d 159 (2d Dep't 1958).
8. Ibid.
